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Thc success of China's approach to transition has produced 
many challenges to the conventiorial wisdom in economic theory. 
The transition in essence is a process of institutional changes 
from those of a planned economy to those of a market economy. 
In the paper we argue that the economic institutions of the 
planned economy are endogenously shaped t)y the adoption of a 
comparative advantage-defylng (hereafter CAD strategy) heavy- 
industry-oriented development strategy in a capital scarce 
economy. I t  is, hence, suggested the completion of China's 
transition to a market economy, which requires the elimination 
of institutional distortions in the planned economy, depends on 
final resolution of viability issue of enterprises in CADS priorlty 
sectors. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the most important events in the modern economic: 
history is the socialist countries, transition from the Soviet-typt: 
planned economy to a market economy starting in the last two 
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decades of the 20th Century. China's experience of transition has 
produced many interesting contrasts to the experiences of transition 
in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union (EEFSU). When the 
transition started in EEFSU, most economists in the West favoured 
a big bang approach, which included stabilization, price liberal- 
ization, and privatization. They considered these three reforms to be 
necessary for a successful transition to a market economy and 
attempted to complete all these reforms simultaneously or in a 
short sequence (Blanchard et al. 1991; Gomulka 1989; Kahn and 
Richardson 1991; and Lipton and Sachs 1990). The big bang 
approach in essence is a version of the Washington Consensus, 
which is based on the basic principles of the neoclassical eco- 
nomics for a well-functioning market economy and was recom- 
mended by the IMF/World Bank for market-oriented reforms in the 
developing countries. Proponents of the big bang approach expected 
the transition in EEFSU to have a "J-curve" effect on economic 
growth; that is, they expected the GDP in a country that 
implemented the big bang approach to decline initially and then to 
be followed by a strong recovery in a short period of time. Most 
countries in EEFSU followed this approach. The big bang approach, 
nevertheless, has resulted in an unexpected sharp and prolonged 
decline in GDP with extraordinarily high inflation rates and serious 
deterioration of other social indicators World Bank 1996, 2002).1 
China has  adopted an  alternative gradual, evolutiorlal approach 
to the transition since the reform started a t  the end of 1978. This 
approach is piecemeal, partial, incremental, often experimental, and 
especially without large-scale privatization.2 The Chinese approach 
is neither guided by a well-founded theory nor followed a pre- 
determined blueprint. Some economists regard this approach to be 
I The cumulative output decline in countries in Central and Southeastern 
Europe and the Baltics reached 22.6% and in countries in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States reached 50.5%. In 2000, Russia's 
GDP was only 64% of what it had been in 1990, while in 2000 the GDP of 
Poland, the best performing countries in EEFSU, increased only 44%. 
compared to that in 1990. Certainly the collapse of international trade due 
to the demise of CMEA has also contributed to the decline of GNP in these 
countries. However, the big bang approach was undoubtedly a major cause 
of these downfalls (Brada and King 1991; and Csaki 1994). 
?o a large extent, the reform measures and sequencing adopted in 
Vietnam and Lao is very similar to those of China. There seems to be a 
common East Asian model of transition. 
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fatally flawed a n d  self-defeating.:, while t he  big bang  approach is 
theoreticillly perfect a n d  feasible (,Sachs 1993; a n d  Murphy, Shleifc.r. 
a n d  Vishny 1992). In t he  late 1980s,  many  observers predicted the 
reforms in China would lead to nowhere, a n d  its e x p e r i e x e  
provided a useful, negative lesson for t he  EEFSU (Prybyla 1990.  p. 
194).  However, contrasting t he  er:onomic collapse a n d  social crisis 
i n  EEFSU. China h a s  become the  fastest growing country in t he  
world ever since t he  transition started. China h a s  also successfully 
controlled t he  inflation at a n  acceptable level.4 
The success  of China's approach 1.0 transition s o  far  has 
produced many challenges to  conventional wisdom in  economic 
theory (Chow 1997; a n d  Perkins 2002).  This approach violates 
almost a.11 basic propositions for a successful transition from a 
planned economy to a market  economy t h a t  a r e  identified by many  
economists advising the former socialist countries i n  t h e  early 
phase  of their transition.5 The success  h a s  puzzled matly 
economists (Nolan 1995).  Some economists attribute t h e  China's 
success  to the their unique init.ial conditions, namely, a lar,<e 
agricultu:ral labor force, low s ~ ~ b s i d i e s  to population, a rather  
decentralized economic system. a n d  a large amoun t  of wealthy 
overseas Chinese (Balcerowicz 1994: Woo 1993; Sachs  a n d  Woo 
1994 a n d  1997; a n d  Qian and  Xu 1994).6 According t o  these 
economists. China's experience does no t  have general implicatioris 
3 In the words of Vaclav Klaus, former Finance Minster of Czechoslovalua. 
"Partial reform in a distorted economy is worse than no reform." (quoted in 
Wiles 199!j, p. 56) 
4 ~ h i n a ' s  annual GDP growth rate reached 9.4% in 1979-2002: where.1~ 
the inflation rate, measured by the retailed price index, was 5.3% annually 
in the same period. 
?he basic propositions. according 1.0 Nolan (1995, pp. 401-2). include: 1) 
'market socialism' cannot work: 2) institutional reform cannot be successful 
unless there is macroeconomic stability; 3) enterprises' attempts to make 
profits will not produce socially dtsirable outcomes unless prices are 
determined by market forces: 4) eco~lomic progress will be greatly inhibited 
unless thr economy is fully integrated into the world economy: 5) the pa*:? 
of the transition from central planning needs to be rapid; and 6)  a ~ i d  
democratic political institutions are a necessary condition of success wi h 
economic reform. 
6 However. the initial conditions are not necessarily to the net advanla,<e 
of China':; transition. See the insightful discussion by Ch'ang and Nolan 
( 1  9135). 
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because China's initial conditions are unique. However, other 
economists suggest that China's success poses a challenge to the 
wisdom of Washington Consensus which considers stabilization. 
market liberalization, and privatization as  necessary components to 
a successful transition, and the Chinese experience demonstrates 
the superiority of evolutionary, experimental, and bottom-up re- 
forms over the comprehensive and top-down big bang approach 
(Chen et al. 1992; Harrold 1992; Jefferson and Rawski 1995; 
McKinnon 1994; McMillan and Naughton 1992; Murrell 1991, 1992; 
Perkins 1992; Rana 1995; Rawski 1995; and Singh 1991). 
When the transition started in EEFSU, the socialist ideology had 
bankrupted. In addition to the fact that there was no theory 
supporting a gradual switch of system (Aslund 1991, p. 37). a new 
ideology of capitalist triumphalism prevailed.7 Therefore, the coun- 
tries in the EEFSU intended to have a rapid and comprehensive 
change and expected to jump to a market economy in a short 
period of time.8 However, as reviewed by the 1996 U'orld Devel- 
opment Report, the experience in Poland and other countries shows 
that although stabilization and liberalization can be implemented 
quickly. privatization may take a number of years to accomplish, 
the development of market supporting institutions, such as legal 
and financial systems, will take years, even decades.9 Therefore, no 
7 The capitalist triumphalism. as  defined by Wiles (1995. p. 48). is 
"Thatcherism plus optimism: i.e. monetarism plus privatization plus 
dogmatism, but also irresponsible (i.e.. not Thatcherie) versions of easy 
success. 
@The instruction to Jeffrey Sachs, when he was invited to advise the 
reform programs by Solidarity leadership in Poland in July 1989, reflected 
the general mood: "Give u s  the outline that you see fit. But make it a 
program of rapid and comprehensive change. And please, start the outline 
with the words. 'With this program, Poland will jump to the market 
economy.' We want to move quickly; that is the only way that this will 
make sense to our society, that it will make sense politically, and-as  we 
understand form experts-the only way it will make sense economically as  
well." (Sachs 1993. pp. 43-4). 
9 Even Jeffrey Sachs, the most famous proponent of big bang approach. 
changed his position on the speed of privatization. In the 1991 World Bank 
Annual Conference on Development Economics, he proposed to accelerate 
the privatization in Poland and argued that, otherwise, the entire process of 
transition would be stalled for years to come (Sachs 1991). In his later 
writings, he only argues that the government of a transition economy to 
have a commitment to privatization (Sachs and Woo 1997). 
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matter what approach is adopted, the transition from a central1.y. 
planned system to a market system in any country, in fact. wi:l 
necessary be a gradual process. ]luring the process of a gradual 
transition, the effectiveness of any individual institutional arrangr- 
ment cannot be ascertained a priori because the function of an 
individual institutional arrangement depends on the functions of 
other institutional arrangements in the inst.itutiona1 structure (Idin 
and Nugent 1995). Despite that market system is accepted as  thlc. 
final goal of transition and what makes a market system work arl- 
known to economists and policy makers. the goal and knowledg~: 
do not provide much guidance for a smooth transition. Therefore, it 
is desirable to have a better understanding about China's ex- 
periences, how China's transitions could have been acconlpanied b ; ~  
rapid and stable economic growth, whether the Chinese approach 
has any g,eneralizable lessons for other economies in transition. 
The transition in essence is a process c ~ f  institutional change:$ 
from those of a planned economy (o  those of a market economy. 111 
the paper we will argue that the economic institut.ions of thc 
planned economy are endogenously shaped by the adopt.ion of ;I 
comparative advantage-defying heavy-indust.1~-oriented development 
strategy in a capital scarce econol-ny (hereafter CAD strategy). This 
strategy nnakes enterprises in tht: priority sectors of CAD strateg, 
nonviable in an  open, competi1.ive market. Many institutional 
distortions in the planned economy are req~~i red  for protecting anti 
subsidizing those nonviable enterprises in the CAD strategy. Thc 
shock therapy, which attempts to eliminate the institutional 
distortion:; simultaneously, causes economic collapse due to the 
fact that this transition approach neg1ect.s the endogenous naturl: 
of those distortions. The gradual approach in China achieves 
dynamic growth because this approach continues to provide 
protections and subsidies to the nonviable enterprises while 
allowing flor entry of enterprises, which are consistent with China':; 
comparative advantages. The completion of China's transition to ;I 
market economy, which requires the elimination of institutional 
distortions in the planned economy, depends on final resolution of 
viability issue of enterprises in CAD'S priority sectors. 
The organization of the paper is as  follows: Section I1 discusse:~ 
the logic origin of economic institutions in a planned economy anti 
many economic problems before and after- the transitions in China 
and EEFSU. In section 111, we will provide a review of the process 
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of reforms in China. Some lessons from the Chinese experience are 
presented in Section IV. It is followed by the concluding remarks in 
Section V. 
11. Development Strategy and Institutions in Traditional 
Socialist Economic System 
Due to the differences in the stage of development, agriculture 
was a larger sector in China than that in EEFSU. Despite this 
difference, the nature and problems of the economic system in 
China and in FSUEE were very similar (McKinnon 1995). They all 
had a Soviet-type planning economic system before the transition.10 
It is recognized that the economic institutions in a Soviet-type 
economy is a coherent whole with its own inherent logic, necessary 
components, and natural interaction of those components (Ericson 
1991; and Komai 1992). Lin, Cai, and Li (2003) show that the 
economic institutions in a Soviet-type planning economy were 
endogenous to the choice of a CAD strategy in a capital-scarce 
economy. 
We will first analyse the effect of a CAD strategy on the 
formation of economic institutions, using the Chinese case as  an 
example. China's pre-reform economic structure had three 
integrated institutional components: (1) a distorted macro-policy 
environment which featured artificially depressed interest rates, 
over-valued exchange rates, low nominal wage rates a s  well as  low 
price levels for living necessities and raw materials; (2) a planned 
allocation mechanism for credit, foreign exchange, and other 
materials; and (3) a traditional micro-management system of State- 
owned Enterprises (hereafter SOEs) and collective agriculture. These 
three institutional components were endogenous to the choice of 
the CAD strategy in a capital-scarce agrarian economy, although 
the specific institutional arrangements that were actually adopted in 
China were also shaped by socialist ideology, the Chinese 
Communist Party's experience during the revolution, and the 
Chinese government's political capacity." 
10 Even although Hungary and Poland had been experimenting market 
liberalization for over a decade before the rush to liberalization after 1989, 
the broad outlines of their economies were still those of the Soviet model 
(Lavigne 1995). 
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At the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the Chinese 
government inherited a war-torn agrarian economy in which 89.4 
percent of the population resided in rural areas and the industrial 
sector contributed only 12.6 percent to the national income. At that 
time, a developed heavy-industry sector was the symbol of a 
nat.ions power and economic achievement. Like government leaders 
in lndia~ and in many other newly independent developing 
countries., Chinese leaders certili~lly intended to accelerate the 
development of heavy industries. After China's involvement in the 
Korean War in 1950, with its resulting embargo and isolation from 
the West.err1 nations, the catching up to the industrialized powers 
had bec~ome a necessity for national security. In addition, the 
Soviet Umion's outstanding record of nation building in the 1930s. 
in contra.st to those of the Great Depression in the Western market 
economies, provided the Chinese leadership with both inspiration 
and experience for adopting a CAD strategy for accelerating China's 
development. Therefore, after recwvering from wartime destruction in 
1953, the Chinese government set it as  the priority the develop- 
ment of heavy industry. The #)a1 was 1.0 build, as  rapidly as 
possible, e country's capacity to produce capital goods a l ~ d  
military materials. This development strategy was shaped up 
through a series of Five-Year Plan.s.12 
Heavy industry is capital intensive. China was a capital-scarce, 
low-incorne, agrarian economy in the 1950s. Therefore, the 
capital-in.tensive heavy industry was not China's comparative 
advantage at that time. The construction of a heavy-industry 
project in a developing country has three characteristics: 1) i t  
requires a long gestation;ls 2) most equipment for a project, at 
1 1  
perk in.^ and Yusuf (1984. p. 4) noted that a unique feature of China's 
economic development under socialism was the government's capacity to 
implement village-level programs nationwide through bureaucratic and Party 
channels. Therefore, the Chinese government was able to impose certain 
~nstitutional arrangements, such as  the collective farming system instead of 
the Soviets state farms, in the economy, deemed as  important by ideolo9 
or by economic rationality, which may not be feasible in other economies 
(Perluns 1966). 
1 ?he Five-Year Plan was disrupted from 1963-5, the period immediatrly 
after the agricultural crisis of 1959-62. The first to the seventh Five-Year 
Plans covered. respectively, the periods from 1952-7. 1958-62. 1966-70, 
1971-5. 1975-80. 1981-5. and 1986-!30. 
'Yhr. construction of a light-indu:jtry prqjeci:, such as a small textilr 
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least in the initial stage, need to be imported from the relatively 
advanced economies; and 3) each project requires a lump-sum 
investment. When the Chinese government initiated this strategy in 
the early 1950s, the Chinese economy also had three distinct 
characteristics: 1) the available capital was limited, and, conse- 
quently, the market interest rate was high; 14 2) foreign exchange 
was scarce and expensive because exportable goods were limited 
and primarily consisted of low-price agricultural products; and 3) 
the economic surplus was small and scattered to widespread 
household farms due to China nature of a densely-populated poor 
agrarian economy. Because the three characteristics of Chinese 
economy were mismatched with the three characteristics of a heavy 
industry project. enterprises in the priority sectors were not viable 
in an open, competitive market (Lin 2003) and a spontaneous 
development of the capital-intensive industry in Chinese economy 
was impossible.15 Therefore, a set of distortions was required for 
the development of heavy industry. At the beginning of the first 
Five-Year Plan, the government instituted a policy of low interest 
rates and over-valued exchange rates to reduce both the costs of 
factory, takes one or hvo years to complete. The construction of a large 
heay-industry project, in general, takes a much longer time. For example. 
in China the average construction time for a metallurgy plant is 7 years, for 
a chemical plant is 5-6 years, and for a machine-building plant is 3-4 year 
(Li and Zheng 1989, p. 170). 
1 Yhree percent per month was a normal interest rate in the informal 
financial markets that existed before the adoption of the development 
strategy. It is equivalent to 36 percent per year. 
15 A spontaneous development of heavy industry was impossible for several 
reasons. First, the high interest rates would make any project that requires 
a long gestation unfeasible. For example, it takes on average 7 years in 
China to complete the construction of a metallurgy plant, as  indicated in 
footnote 13. The market interest rate in the early 1950s in China was 
about 30 percent per year (2.5 percent per month). Suppose the fund for 
the project was borrowed at market rate and repayment was made after the 
completion of the project. The principal and interest payment, calculated at 
a compound rate, for each dollar borrowed at the first year of the project 
would be 6.27 dollars. It is obvious that no project would be profitable 
enough to shoulder such a high interest burden. Second, since most 
equipment needed to be imported from advanced countries, the limited 
supply of foreign exchange again made the construction of heavy industry 
expensive under the market-determined exchange rate. Third, because the 
agricultural surplus was small and scattered, it was difficult to mobilize 
enough funds for any lump-sum project. 
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interest  payments and of importing equipment.lG Meanwhile. in 
order to secure enough funds  for industrial  expansion, a policy of 
low inpu t  prices, including nominal wage: rates for workers17 a n d  
prices for raw materials, energy and transportation, evolved 
alongside the adoption of this  development strategy. The a s s u m p -  
tion w a s  that low prices would enable the enterprises to creatc 
profits large enough to repay the loans or  to accumulate  sufficient 
fund for reinvestment. If the entcrprises were privately owned, t h ~ :  
State could not  be s u r e  t ha t  the private entrepreneurs  would 
reinvest the policy-created profits on the intended projects.l;i 
Therefore, private enterprises were soon nati13nalizedlg a n d  new key 
enterprises were owned by the State  to secure t he  State's control 
over profits for reinvestment in  the heavy-industry projects. 
Meanwhile, to make the low nominal-wage policy feasible. tht: 
governnierit h a d  to provide urbari residerlts with inexpensive food 
and other  necessities, including housing, medical care,  a n d  
clothing. 'The low interest rates,  over-valued exchange rates ,  lovi 
16 For example, the interest rate on bank loans was officially reduced fronl 
30 percent per year to about five percent per year. For a one-dollar fund 
borrowed at  the beginning of a 7 year project, the principal and interest 
payment at the time that the project was completed would be reduced iron1 
6.27 dollars to 1.41 dollars. 
17 Despite the real GNP per capita tiad tripled between 1952 and 1978. 
the nominal wage was kept almost constant, increasing only 10.3 percent, 
during the same period (China Statr: Statistical Yearbook 1987. p. 151). 
However, because of in-lund subsidic:j, the real wages to urban worken 
were not as low as  the nominal wages suggested. Moreover, urban wag(? 
rates may decline sharply if the restriction on the rural-urban migration i:j 
removed. We owe this point to an anonymous referee. For a more detailed 
discussion of the formation of low nominal-wage policy, see, for exampl~. 
Cheng (1982, Chap. 8) and Wu (1965. Chap. 4). 
" ~ v e n  with all the above price distortions that facilitate the 
heavy-industry development in China, the lime period required by :I 
heavy-industry project to earn back the capital investment was, on average. 
about 4 to 5 times longer than the period required by a light-indust?: 
project (Li 1983, p. 37). Therefore. a profit-maximizing private owner woul(1 
have higher incentives to invest in a light-industry project. 
19 lJnder the New Democracy Policy, adopted by the Communist Party i l l  
the late 1$340s, private enterprises were supposed to coexist with State- 
owned enterprises for an extended period after the revolution. However, the 
enterprises were soon nationalized after 1952 when the government adopted 
the CAD STRATEGY. The attempt to secure profits for the heavy-industr~ 
projects was the motivation for the go~iernment's change in position towart1 
private entc:rprises. 
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nominal wage rates,  and low prices for raw materials and living 
necessities constituted the basic macro policy environment of t h e  
CAD strategy.20 
The above distortions induced a total imbalance in the supply 
a n d  demand  for credit, foreign exchange, raw materials, and other  
living necessities. Because non-priority sectors would be  competing 
with the priority sectors for the low-priced resources,  plans a n d  
administrative controls replaced markets as the mechanism for 
allocating scarce credit, foreign reserves, r aw  materials, and living 
necessities, ensuring that limited resources would be  used  for t he  
targeted projects. Moreover, the State monopolized banks ,  foreign 
trade, and material distribution systems.21 
In th i s  way competition was  suppressed,  a n d  profits ceased to be 
the measure  of an enterprise's efficiency.22 Because of t he  lack of 
market  discipline, managerial  discretion w a s  potentially a ser ious 
problem. Managers of SOEs were deprived of autonomy to mitigate 
2 ?heoretically, the government could use subsidies instead of distorting 
the price signals as  a means to facilitate the development of capital- 
intensive heavy industry in a capital-scarce economy. It can be shown that 
the subsidy policy is more efficient economically than the policy of price 
distortion. However, with the subsidy policy, the heavy industry would incur 
a huge explicit loss and the government would have to tax other sectors 
heavily to subsidize the loss. Under such circumstances, the government 
would find it difficult to defend its position of accelerating the development 
of heavy industry. Moreover, the government in an underdeveloped economy 
may not have the ability to collect huge taxes. This may explain why 
governments. not only in socialist economies but also in capitalist eco- 
nomies, use price distortions instead of subsidies to facilitate the develop- 
ment of priority sectors. 
21 In the literature in China and other socialist countries, many authors 
presumed that the distorted policy environment and the administrative 
controls were shaped by socialist doctrines. The socialist ideology' might play 
a role in the formation of these policies, however, the existence of these 
policies and controls also have an economic rationale. They facilitate the 
implementation of a CAD strategy in a capital-scarce economy. This 
explains why non-socialist developing economies, such as  India, also had a 
similar policy environment and administrative controls when they adopted 
the same development strategy. 
22 An enterprise is bound to be loss-making if its outputs happen to be 
inputs to the other sectors, for example energy and transportation, because 
the prices of its outputs are suppressed. On the contrary, an enterprise is 
bound to be profit-making if its outputs are a t  the low end of the industrial 
chain, because the enterprise can enjoy low input prices and high output 
prices a t  the same time. 
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this problem.23 The production of SOEs was dictated by mandatory 
plans and furnished with most of their material inputs through :in 
administrative allocation system. The prices of their products were 
determined by the pricing authorities. Government agencies con- 
trolled the circulation of their products. The wages and salaries of 
workers and managers were determined not by their performan'ze 
but by their education, age, position and other criteria according to 
a national wage scale. Investmerit. and working capital were mostly 
financed by appropriations from the State budget or loans from the 
banking system according to State plans. The SOEs remitted a11 
their profits, if any, to the State and the State budget would allso 
cover all losses incurred by the enterprises. In short, the SOlSs 
were like puppets. They did not have any autonomy over the 
employment of workers, the use of profits, the plan of production, 
the supplies of inputs, and the marketing of their products. 
The development strategy and the resulting policy environment 
and allocation system also shaped the evolution of farming 
institutions in China. In order t.o secure cheap supplies of grain 
and other agricultural products for urban low-price rationing, a 
compulsory procurement policy was imposed in the rural areas in 
1953. This policy obliged peasants to sell set quantities of their 
produce. including grain. cotton, and edible oils to the State at 
government-set prices (Perkins 1966, Chap. 4). 
In addition to providing cheap food for industrialization, 
agriculture was also the main foreign-exchange earner. In the 
1950s, agricultural products alone made up over 40 percent of all 
exports. If processed agricultural proclucts were also counted, 
agriculture contributed to more than 60 percent of China's foreign 
exchange earnings up to the 1970s. Because foreign exchange was 
as  important as  capital for the CAD strategy, the country's capacity 
to import capital goods for industrialization in the early stage of 
development clearly depended on agriculture's performance. 
Agricultural development required resources and investment ;IS 
much as; industrial development. The government, however, was 
reluctant to divert scarce resources and funds from industry to 
2 3 ~ h e  state enterprises were granted some autonomy after the reforms In 
the late 1970s. As expected, one of t-he results of this reform was a rapid 
increase In wages, bonuses and fringe benefits at the expense of the 
enterpnse s profits. 
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agriculture. Therefore, alongside the CAD strategy, the government 
adopted a new agricultural development strategy that would not 
compete for resources with industrial expansion. The core of this 
strategy involved the mass mobilization of rural labour to work on 
labour-intensive investment projects, such as irrigation, flood 
control, and land reclamation, and to raise unit yields in agri- 
culture through traditional methods and inputs, such as  closer 
planting, more careful weeding, and the use of more organic 
fertilizer. The government believed that collectivization of agriculture 
would ensure these functions. The government also viewed collectiv- 
ization a s  a convenient vehicle to effect the State's low-priced 
procurement program of grain and other agricultural products (Luo 
1985). Income distribution in the collectives was based on each 
collective member's contribution to the agricultural production. 
However, monitoring a member's effort is extremely difficult in 
agricultural production due to dimensions of time and space. The 
remuneration system in the collectives was basically egalitarian (Lin 
1988). 
The price distortions, planned allocation system, and micro- 
management institutions outlined above all made the maximum 
mobilization of resources for the development of heavy industry 
possible in a capital-scarce economy. Since most private initiative 
in economic activities was prohibited, the pattern of the govern- 
ment's investment was the best indicator of the bias in the official 
development strategy. Despite the fact that more than three- 
quarters of China's population lived on the agriculture and labor- 
intensive light industries were consistent with China's comparative 
advantages, agriculture and light industries each received a slight 
share of less than 10 percent of the State investment in the period 
1953-85, while 45 percent of the State investment went to heavy 
industry. As a result, the value of heavy industry in the combined 
total value of agriculture and industry grew from 15 percent in 
1952 to about 40 percent in the 1970s.24 
2 %en the reforms started in 1979, the government initially planned to 
increase the share of agriculture in the State fixed capital investment from 
11% in 1978 to 18% in the following 3 to 5 years. Due to the rapid 
agricultural growth brought about by the rural reforms, agriculture's share 
in the State fixed capital investment actually declined sharply to only about 
3% in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the share of total fixed 
capital investment in agriculture in the nation as  a whole did not decline 
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Judging from China's sector cornposition, the trinity of traditional 
planning institutions-the price distortions, the planned allocatior~ 
system, and the puppet-like micro -management institution - reached 
its intendsed goal of setting up the nonviable firms in the prior it!^ 
sectors of CAD strategy in order to accelerate the development of 
heavy industry in China. Nevertheless, China had paid a high pricc: 
for such an  achievement. The economy is very inefficient due to 
two reasons: 1) low allocative efficiency because of the deviation of 
the industrial structure from the piittern dictated by the 
comparative advantages of the e:conomy. and 2) low technical 
efficiency due to managers' and workers' low incentives to work. A:; 
a rr:sult, the economy was very inefficient.. The most important 
indicator reflecting such inefficiency was the extremely low rate of 
total factor productivity growth in China. A World Bank study 
show5 that, even calculated a t  the most favourable terms, t h ~  
growth rate was merely 0.5% bet~hreen 1952-81, only a quarter of 
the average growth rate of 19 devc:loping countries included in th(: 
study (World Bank 1985a). Moreov'er, the total factor productivity of 
China's SOEs was in a state of st;ignatiori or even negative growth 
during the period of 1957-82 (World Bank 1985b). 
111. Chin,a's Approach to Transition 
The institutional arrangements in a Sovlet- type planning economy 
were very good at  mobilizing scarce resources for investment in a 
few clear, well-defined priority sectors (Ericson 199 1) .2Vowever,  ir i  
China as  well as  in the EEFSU, the economy all encountered 
so much as  the figures suggest, because part of the decline in the State 
investment was compensated by an increase in farmers' investment (Feder 
et al. 1992). Similarly, the share of heavy industry in the state fixed capital 
investment did not decline after the rc:forms in 1979. However, the state',j 
share in t.k~e total investment declined from 82% in 1980 to 66O/0 in 1990. 
The non-state sectors' investments are mostly on projects that are less 
capital intensive. Therefore. the share of heavy industry in the nation's fixed 
capital investment is less than the share in the State investment. 
25 An evidence to support the above argument is the fact that, compareti 
to the non-socialist economies at similar levels of economic development. 
the socialist economies, no matter they were in the East Asia or in the 
Eastern Europe or USSR. all had much larger industrial, r:speciall:f 
heavy-indu:jtry, sectors (Rana 1995; anti Lavigne 1995). 
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similar difficulties associated with low allocative and technical 
efficiency. Although the problems that China faced were similar to 
those in the EEFSU, China adopted an approach very different 
from that a t  EEFSU. First, China pursued perestroika (economic 
restructuring) to stimulate the dynamism of the economy but  avoid 
glasnost (political openness) to avoid the collapse of the Communist 
party. The Chinese approach in essence is a "micro" first approach 
(McKinnon 1995), which is different from not only the big bang 
approach in the EEFSU but also the IMFIWorld Bank's standard 
approach for restructuring, which recommended a "micro" first 
approach to transition.26 In China, the transition started with the 
de-collectivization of agriculture, the improvement of the governance 
of state-owned enterprise through the enlargement of enterprise 
autonomy, the promotion of non-state enterprises that face hard 
budget constraints, and the introduction of a dual-track system to 
prices and exchange rate before their liberalization. In China, the 
process did not involve mass privatization. SOEs maintained its 
dominant role in the industrial sector. Through this cautious and 
gradual approach, these economies have been able to replace the 
traditional Soviet-type system with a market system meanwhile 
maintaining remarkable records of growth and price stability during 
the transition process. 
For the governments in the Eastern Europe, the objective of 
transition was clearly defined a t  the very beginning a s  "to replicate 
the economic institutions of Western Europe" (Sachs and Lipton 
1990, p. 47). However, in China the goal was simply to improve the 
efficiency of the economic system and the reform did not have a 
well-designed strategy or policy measures. For example, a s  Perkins 
(1988, p. 601) observed, it was unlikely that China's leaders a t  that 
time had worked out a blueprint when they set out to reform the 
economic system. Instead of being designed a priori, the choice of 
2 b ~ h e  first priority in the IMFIWorld Bank approach is fiscal control. This 
requires an organized internal revenue senrice capable of collecting taxes 
from households and liberalized enterprises in both agriculture and 
industry. After fiscal control, the interest rates can be liberalized and the 
money and credit are hardened to stabilize the prices. Before the removing 
of trade restrictions, foreign exchange rate should be unified. The last stage 
of the reform is the full capital account convertibility, which should wait 
until domestic financial liberalization has been completed and established 
(Rana 1995. pp. 14-5). 
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specific reform measure and the sequence of transition reflected the 
government's pragmatism toward the problems or crisis that 
emerged in the economic system and the opportunities that can be 
utilized to mitigate or solve the problems. The philosophy of 
government decision towards specific reform measures is best 
reflected by Deng Xiaoping's famous saying: "No matter it is a 
white cat- or black cat, a s  long a s  i t  can catch mouse, it is a good 
cat." 'The sequencing of reform measures is best described l ~ y  
another Chinese saying: "To cross a river by groping the stone:;." 
However, retrospectively, the transition process in China followed a 
logical process that is predictable from the internal logic of 
Soviet-type economy (Lin, Cai. and Li 2003. Chap. 5). 
As discussed, the institution:; in a Soviet-type econonly are 
endogenous to the adoption of a CAD strategy in a capital-scarlse 
economy. The main fault in this economic system was low eco- 
nomic efficiency arising from structural imbalance and incentive 
problems. Before the late 1970s, the Chinese government had made 
several a.ttempts to address the structural problems by decentral- 
izing the resource allocation mechanism.27 I-Iowever. the administra- 
tive nature of the allocation mechanism was not changed and the 
price disitortions and managerial system were not altered, and thus 
the atteinpts to rectify the st:ructural imbalance and improve 
economic incentives had failed. The goals of the reform in late 1978 
were also to rectify the structural imbalance and improve 
incentives. However, what set t-he reforms apart from previous 
attempts were the micro-management system reforms, which matie 
farmers and managers and workers in SOEs partial residual 
claimants. This small crack in the trinity of the traditional 
economic system was eventually pried open. leading to the gradual 
dismantlement of the traditional system, and the emergency of a 
market system. 
A. The filicro-Management Systerrt Reforms 
The most important change in the micro-management system was 
the replacement of collective farming with a household-based 
system, which is now known as  the household responsibility 
system. In the beginning, the government had not intended to 
2'7 The first attempt was made in 19158-60, the second in 1961-5, and the 
third in 1!366-76 (Wu and Zhang 1993, pp. 65-7). 
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change the farming institutions. The government had recognized in 
1978 that solving managerial problems within the collective system 
was the key to improving farmers' incentives. However, in the 
resolution adopted by the third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of CPC, which marked the start of transition in China, 
any type of household-based farming arrangement was explicitly 
prohibited. Nevertheless, a collective in a poverty-stricken area 
began to try out secretly a system of leasing a collective's land and 
dividing the obligatory procurement quotas to individual households 
in the collective in late 1978. That area was hit by a drought in 
that year. All other collectives reported sharp reduction in output. 
The output in that collective did not report decline but increased 
30 percent. Observing the advantage of the household-based 
farming system in improving agricultural production, the central 
authorities later conceded to the existence of this new form of 
farming, but requested that it be restricted to the poor agricultural 
regions. mainly to hilly or mountainous areas, and to the poor 
collectives in which people had lost confidence in the collective 
system. However, this restriction was ignored in most regions. 
Production improved after a collective adopted the new system. 
regardless of its relative wealth or poverty. Full official recognition 
of the household responsibility system as a "socialist" farming 
institution and applicable to any collective in China was eventually 
given in late 1982. By that time, 45 percent of the collectives in 
China had already been dismantled and had instituted the 
household responsibility system. By the end of 1983. 98 percent of 
agricultural collectives in China had adopted this new system. 
When the household responsibility system first appeared, the land 
lease was limited to only one to three years. However, the short 
lease reduced farmers' incentives for land-improvement investment. 
The lease contract was allowed for an extension to 15 years in 
1984. In 1993, the government allowed the lease contract to be 
extended for another 30 years after the expiration of the first 
contract. 
Unlike the spontaneous nature of farming institution reform. 
reforms in the management system of the SOEs were initiated by 
the State. These reforms have undergone four stages. The first 
stage (1979-83) emphasized several important experimental initia- 
tives that were intended to allow for greater enterprise autonomy 
and to expand the role of financial incentives within the traditional 
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economic system. These measures included the introduction ( i f  
profit retcntion and performance-r1::lated bonuses and permitted tlie 
SOEs to produce outside the mandatory State plan. The enterprises 
involved in exports were allowed to retain part of their foreign 
exchange earnings for use a t  thelr own discretion. In the seconci 
stage (1984-6) the emphasis shifted to ;a formalization of the 
financial obligations of the SOEs to the government and exposed 
enterprises to market influences. From 1983, profit remittances to 
the government were replaced I.)y a profit tax. In 1984, th: 
government allowed SOEs to sell output in excess of quotas at  
negotiated prices and to plan their output accordingly, thus 
establishing the dual-track price system. In the third stage 
(1987-92). the contract responsib1.1ity sys1.ern. which attempted to 
clarify the authority and responsibilities of enterprise managers, 
was forn1;llized and widely adopted. The last stage (1993-present) 
attempted to introduce the modern corporate system to the SOEs. 
In each :itage of the reform, ttilf: governrrient's intervention was 
reduced further and the SOEs gained more autonomy. 
The reform of the micro-management system has achieved it:< 
intended goal of improving technical efficiency. Empirical estimate:; 
show that almost half of the 42.2 percent growth of output in thc~ 
cropping sector in the years 1978-84 was driven by productivit!~ 
change brought about by the refi~r~ns.  Furthermore, almost all of 
the above productivity growth was attributable to the changes 
resulting from the introduction of the household responsibilit!~ 
system (Fan 1991; Huang and Roz:elle 1996: Lin 1992: McMillan et 
al. 1989; and Wen 19931.28 Production function estimates by 
several studies find that for indi.istry the increase in enterprise 
autonomy increased productivity in the SOEs (Chen et al. 1988; 
Gordon arid Li 1991; Dollar 1990; Jefferson et al. 1992; Groves et 
al. 1994; and Li 1997).29 Therefore. the reforms in micro-management 
system in both agriculture and industry have created a flow of new 
resources, an important feature of China's reforms. 
The increase in enterprise autonomy under a distorted macro- 
policy environment, however. also invited the discretionary behavioi- 
28 Similar gain in agricultural productivity was also observed in Vietnam': 
;agricultural de-collectivization (Pingali and Xuan 15392). 
29 Similar productivity gain is also reported for Vietnans State-owned 
~enterprisrs. See the empirical studies cited in Sun (1997, pp. 3-4). 
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of the managers and the workers. Despite an  improvement in 
productivity, the profitability of the SOEs declined and the 
government's subsidies increased due to both a faster increase in 
wages, fringe benefits, and other unauthorized expenditures (Fan 
and Schaffer 1991) and the competition from the autonomous 
township-and-village enterprises (TVEs) (Jefferson and Rawski 
19951.30 However, once the enterprises had tasted the fruits of 
autonomy, it would have been politically too costly to revoke it. The 
decline in the profits of SOEs and the competition from TVEs 
forced the government to adopt other measures that further 
increased the autonomy of SOEs in the hope that the new 
measures would make the enterprises financially independent. 
B. Resource Allocation Mechanism Reform 
The increase in enterprise autonomy put pressure on the planned 
distribution system. Because the SOEs were allowed to produce 
outside the mandatory plans, the enterprises needed to obtain 
additional inputs and to sell the extra outputs outside the planned 
distribution system. Under pressure from the enterprises, material 
supplies were progressively de-linked from the plan, and retail 
commerce was gradually deregulated. At the beginning, certain key 
inputs remained controlled. However, the controlled items were 
increasingly reduced. Centralized credit rationing was also delegated 
to local banks a t  the end of 1984. 
An unexpected effect of the relaxation of the resources allocation 
mechanism was the rapid growth of the non-state enterprises, 
especially the TVEs.31 Rural industry already existed under the 
traditional system as  a result of the government's decision to 
mechanize agriculture and to develop rural processing industries to 
3 0 ~ e  will discuss the emergence of TVEs and its impacts on the reform 
of SOEs in the following subsection. 
31 The non-state enterprises include the TVEs, the private enterprises, and 
joint-venture enterprises, overseas Chinese enterprises, and foreign 
enterprises. Among them, the TVEs are the most important in terms of 
output share and number of enterprises. It is noteworthy that TVEs, 
although different in many aspects from SOEs, are public enterprises that 
are funded, owned, and supervised by the township or village governments. 
A enterprise-level study found that there is no essential difference in the 
allocation of control rights between the SOEs and TVEs (Jefferson. Zhao, 
and Lu 1995). 
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finance the mechanization in 1971. In 1978 the output of W E s  
consisted of 7.2 percent of the total value of industrial output in 
China. Before the reforms, the growth of TVEs was severely 
constrained by access to credits, raw materials and markets. The 
reforms created two favorable con.ditions for the rapid exparision of 
TVEs. 1) A new stream of surpluses brought out by the household 
responsibility reform provided a :resource base for new investmeilt 
activities. 2) The relaxation of rigidity in the traditional planned 
allocationi mechanism provided access t.o key raw materials artd 
markets. In the period 1981-91. the number of TVEs. ernploymen t. 
and the total output value grew a t  an  average annual rate of 
26.6%. 11.2%, and 29.6%. respectively. TVEs' annual growth rate 
in total output value was three times that of the State enterprises 
in t.he same period. In 1993, '['VEs' output accounted for 38.1 
percent of the total industrial output in China. The share of 
industria11 output from non-State enterprises increased from >!2 
percent in 1978 to 56.9 percent in 199:3 (State Statistical Bureau 
1995, p. 73). The emergence of TVEs has been claimed as  the 
greatest achievement of China's reform (See, for instance. Sun 
(1997)). 
The rapid entry of TVEs and other type of non-state enterprisc:~ 
produced two unexpected effects on the reforms. First, non-state 
enterprises were the product of markets. Being outsiders to the 
traditional economic system, nor]-state enterprises had to obtain 
energy and raw materials from competitive markets, and their 
products could be sold only to markets. 'They faced hard budget 
constraints and they would not survive if their management we-re 
poor. Their employees did not have an  "iron rice bowl" and could 
be fired. As a result, the non-state enterprises were mo.re 
productive than the SOEs (Weitzman and Xu 1994; and Sun 1997). 
The dynamism of non-state enterprises exerted a pressure on the 
SOEs and triggered the State's policy of transplanting the micro- 
managem.ent system of the non-state enterprises to the SOEs artd 
of delegating more autonomy to the SOEs. Reform measures fix 
improving the micro-management system of SOEs-such :is 
replacement of profit remittance I:)y a profit tax, the establishment 
of Lhe contract responsibility system, and the introduction of tlie 
modern corporate system to SOEs-were responses to competitive 
pressure from TVEs and other non-state enterprises (Jefferson artd 
Rawski 1995). The increase in competition among the enterpriscs 
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and between the state and non-state enterprises also increases the 
productivity of the SOEs (Li 1997). Secondly, the development of 
non-state enterprises significantly rectified the misallocation of 
resources. In most cases, non-state enterprises had to pay market 
prices for their inputs, and their products were sold a t  market 
prices. The price signals induced non-state enterprises to adopt 
more labor-intensive technology and to concentrate on more 
labor-intensive small industries than on SOEs.32 Therefore, the 
technological structure of non-state enterprises was more consistent 
with the comparative advantages of China's endowments. The entry 
of TVEs mitigated the structural imbalance caused by the heavy 
industry-oriented development strategy. 
C. Price Distortions Reform 
Amongst the trinity of the traditional planning system, the price 
distortions linked most closely to the development strategy, and its 
effects on allocative and technical efficiency were indirect. The 
reforms of the price distortions were thus the most sluggish. We 
will argue later that most economic problems that appeared during 
the reforms-for example, the cyclic pattern of growth and the 
rampant rent seeking-can be attributed to the inconsistency 
between the price distortions and the liberalized allocation and 
enterprise system. Therefore, the Chinese government constantly 
faced a dilemma: to make the price system consistent with the 
liberalized micro-management institution and resource allocation 
mechanism or to re-centralize the micro-management institution 
and resource allocation mechanism for maintaining the internal 
consistency of the traditional economic system. The deprivation of 
enterprise autonomy would definitely incur the resistance of 
managers and employees of SOEs. A return to the traditional 
economic system would also suggest a reversion to economic 
stagnation. Therefore, no matter how reluctant the government was. 
the only sustainable choice was to eliminate the price distortions 
and make the price system consistent with the liberalized allocation 
32 For example. in 1986 an  average industrial enterprise in China had 
179.9 workers, and the fixed investment per worker was 7,510 yuan (China 
Industrial Economy Statistical Material 1987, p. 3); whereas an average TVE 
in the same year had 28.9 workers, and the fxed investment per worker 
was 1.709 yuan [Statistical Yearbook of China 1987. p. 205). 
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and micro'-management system. 
Changes in the price distortions started in the commodity pricl: 
system. After the introduction of profit ret.ention, the enterprises 
were allclwed to produce outside the: mandatory plan. Th'z 
 enterprise:^ first used an inforn~al barter system to obtain th,? 
outside-plan inputs and to sell the out.side-plan products a t  
premium prices. In 1984. the government introduced the dual-traclc 
price system, which allowed the SC)Es to sell their output in excess 
of quotas at market prices and 1.0 plan their output accordingly. 
The aim of the dual-track price system was to reduce the marginal 
price distortion in the SOEs' prodi,~ction decisions while leaving the 
State a measure of control over n~aterial allocation. As the share of 
a commodity that was allocated under the plan price gradually 
reduced clue to the growth of non-state sectors and the outside- 
the-plan ]production activity of the SOEs, the government woultl 
then give up the plan price, allowing the price to converge to thl: 
market prices.33 By 1988 only 30 percent of retail sales were mad12 
a t  plan prices, and the SOEs obtained 60  percent of their input:i 
and sold 60 percent of their outputs at  market prices (Zou 1992). 
By 1996. with the exception for a few raw materials and coal. fuel. 
and transportation, the prices for most commodities and semice:s 
have been liberalized. 
The second major change in thc. distor1:ed price system occurreti 
in the foreign exchange rate. In the years 1979-80, the official 
exchange rate was roughly 1.5 y ~ . ; m  per US dollar. The rate coultl 
not cover the costs of exports, as  the average cost of earning one 
US dollar was around 2.5 yuan. A dual rate system was adopted at  
the beginning of 1981. Commodity trade was settled a t  the internal 
rate of 2.8 yuan per dollar; the official rate of 1.53 yuan per dollar 
continued to apply to non-commodity transactions. After 1985, the 
yuan was gradually devalued. Moreover, the proportion of retained 
foreign exchange, which was introduced in 1979, was gradua1l:y 
raised, and enterprises were allowed to swap their foreign exchangc 
entitlement with other enterprises through the Bank of China a t  
33 I3y the time the price of a commo~:lity was liberalized, the proportion cf 
the commodity that was allocated by rhe plan, compared to the proportio~l 
that was allocated by the market. was very small already. Therefore, the 
shock was much smaller than the gap between the market price and plan 
price \voultl indicate. The process of (::<change rate liberalization, which wi'l 
be discussc:d later, is the best example. 
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rates higher than the official exchange rate. Restrictions on trading 
foreign exchanges were further relaxed with the establishment of a 
"foreign exchange swap center" in Shenzhen in 1985, in which 
enterprises could trade foreign exchanges at negotiated rates. By 
the late 1980s. such centers were established in most provinces in 
China and more than 80  percent of the foreign-exchange earnings 
were swapped in such centers (Sung 1994). The climax of foreign 
exchange rate policy reform was the establishment of a managed 
floating system and unification of the dual rate system on January 
1. 1994, by that time 80 percent of foreign exchanges has already 
been allocated through the swap markets.34 
Interest-rate policy is the least affected area of the traditional 
macro-policy environment. Under the heavy industry-oriented 
development strategy, the interest rate was kept artificially low to 
facilitate the expansion of capital-intensive industries. After the 
reforms started in 1979, the government was forced to raise both 
the loan rates and the savings rates several times.35 However, the 
rates were maintained at levels far below the market-clearing rates 
throughout the reform process. In late 1993, the government 
announced a plan to establish three development banks with the 
function of financing long-term projects, import/export, and 
agricultural infrastructure at  subsidized rates and to turn the 
existing banks into commercial banks, allowing the banks to set 
the interest rates freely. The three development banks were 
3 ' ~ i e t n a m  and Lao also adopted the dual-track system to reform the  
prices and exchange rates a t  the early stage o f  the  transition. Almost total 
deregulation o f  prices and exchange rates occurred in  Vie tnam i n  1989 and 
i n  G o  i n  1988. This  total deregulation is  sometime used as  evidence that 
Vie tnam adopted a big bang approach to  transition (Sachs and W o o  1997; 
and Popov 1996). However, according to  the  definition, a big bang approach 
includes three essential elements: comprehensive price and trade 
liberalization, stablization, and commitment t o  mass  privatization o f  the  
SOEs (Sachs and Woo  1997, p. 5). However. V ie tnam not  only did not 
totally remove its trade restrictions, b u t  also did not  have any commitment  
for privatization o f  SOEs. Therefore, Vietnams total price liberalization in  
1989 was  a partial instead o f  a big bang approach reform. 
3 90 stop bank  runs ,  the  savings rates were indexed to inflation rates i n  
October 1988. But the  policy was revoked i n  1991. In May 1993, t he  
interest rate for a one-year t ime deposit was  9.18 percent, and for a 
one-to-three-year basic investment loan it was  10.80 percent (China 
Statistics Yearbook 1993. pp. 670-71). However. the  market rate for a 
commercial loan was between 15 and 25 percent. 
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established in 1994. The commercializatiorl of the existing ban1.s 
was initially expected to take a t  least anol.her three to five years. 
However, the mentality of CAD strategy is deeply rooted in the 
mind of China's political leaders. To protect the existing nonviable 
SOEs and to set up new enterprises in the priority sectors of CAD 
strategy, some distorted institutional arrangement, at  the very iea:it 
in the form of a suppressed interest rate policy, is essential. So far 
the interest rate in China has not been liberalized.36 
A unique feature of China's transition is  the continuous growth 
during the transition process. The above discussion provides an  
explanation for the success. When the transition started, the 
attempt of Chinese government was to in~prove incentives in the 
SOEs and collective farms by giving agents in SOEs and collective 
farms some autonomy and allowing a closer link between personal 
rewards and individual. The empirical studies cited in the above 
discussio:n show, in spite of the lack privat.ization, the attempt was 
successful and a new stream of resources was created by the 
micro-management system reform. Thr: partial autonomy also 
implies that. entrepreneurs in t h r :  state sector and in rural a r m  
gain partial control over the allocation of the newly created streain 
of resources. The suppressed sect1:trs in the traditional economy are 
the sectors that are consistent with the comparative advantages (of 
the economy and are more profitable due to the existence 11f 
unsatisfied demands. The unexpected results of the micro- 
management reform are that, driven by profit motivation, the 
autonomous entrepreneurs alloca-ted the new stream of resources 
under their control to the more profitable suppressed sectors. Since 
the planned allocation mechani.sm and price distortions were 
preserved, the State still had control over the old stream l ~ f  
resources and guaranteed that these resources would be allocated 
to supports the nonviable firms in the priority sectors. Therefore. 
throughout the reform process, the economy avoided the collapse of 
nonviable firms in the priority sector and enjoyed continuous 
growth. R4oreover, as the economy grew, t.he proportion of resources 
that was allocated according to the planned prices becanle 
increasingly small. Therefore, by the time the price for a commodi:.y 
3 " ~ n  Victtnam, the interest rates are increased occasionally but not 
liberalized. In the case of Lao, the interest rates have been liberalized since 
1989 although the Central bank still sets the foor and ceiling ratio. 
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was liberalized, the shock was much smaller than the gap between 
the market price and plan price would have suggested. 
However, there were some costs associated with the above- 
mentioned approach to transition. Because the reforms in price 
system, especially those regarding the interest rate, lagged behind 
the reforms in the allocation mechanism and micro-management 
institutions, there were several economic consequences. The first 
one was the recurrence of a growth cycle. The interest rate was 
maintained at an artificially low level. The enterprises had 
incentives to obtain more credits than the supply permitted. Before 
the reforms, the excess demands for credit were suppressed by 
restrictive central rationing. The delegation of credit approval 
authority to local banks in the autumn of 1984 resulted in a rapid 
expansion of credits and an investment thrust. As a result, the 
money supply increased 49.7 percent in 1984 compared to its level 
in 1983. It caused the inflation rate to jump from less than 3 
percent in the previous years to 8.8 percent in 1985. In 1988 the 
government's attempt to liberalize price controls caused a high 
inflation expectation. The interest rate for savings was not adjusted. 
Therefore, panic buying and a mini-bank run occurred. Loans, 
however, were maintained a t  the previously set level. As a 
consequence, the money supply increased by 47 percent in 1988. 
The inflation rate in 1988 reached 18 percent. During the periods 
of high inflation, the economy overheated. A bottleneck in transpor- 
tation, energy, and the supply of construction materials appeared. 
Because the government was reluctant to increase the interest rate 
a s  a way to check the investment thrust, it had to resort to 
centralized rationing of credits and direct control of investment 
projects-a return to the planned system. The rationing and 
controls gave the State sectors a priority position. The pressure of 
inflation was reduced, but slower growth followed. 
As mentioned earlier, although the reforms in the micro- 
management system improved the productivity of the State sector, 
deficits increased due to the discretionary behavior of the managers 
and workers in the SOEs. Therefore, fiscal income increasingly 
depended on the non-state sectors. During the period of tightening 
State control, the growth rates of the non-state sectors declined 
because the non-state sectors' access to credits and raw materials 
were restricted. Such a slowdown in the growth rate became fiscally 
unbearable. Therefore. the State was forced to liberalize the 
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administrative controls in order to make room for the growth of tht? 
non-state sectors. A period of fast-er growth followed. Nevertheless. 
conflicts between the distorted mi3cro-policy environment and th~: 
liberalized allocation and micro-management system arose again. 
A second consequence of the in~::onsistency between the distorted 
policy environment and the liberalized allocation mechanism ant1 
micro-management institutions was a rampant rent-seeking phe- 
nomenon. After the reforms market prices existed, legally or 
illegally, along with planned prices for almost every kind of input 
and comnnodity that the State controlled. 'The difference betweell 
the market price and the planned price was an economic rent. It i:j 
estimated that the economic rent from Lhe controlled commodit;r 
price. the interest rate, and the exchange rate was at  least 200 
billion yuan. about 2 1.5 percent of the national income in 1988. 111 
1992, the economic rent from bank loans alone reached 220 billiori 
yuan (Hu 1994).37 The non-state enterprises as  well as  the au -  
tonomous SOEs certainly had incentives to engage in rent- seeking 
activities through bribes and other measures to obtain the 
under-priced resources from the State iillocation agencies. It i:i 
reported that under competitive pressure, the SOEs in the h e a p  
industries, which were given priorities in obtaining the State- 
controlled resources, also needed to give certain side payments to 
the bank:; and other allocation agencies in order to secure the 
earmarked loan and materials or t.o obtain them promptly. 
Because of the rent-seeking activities of other types of 
enterprise:;. SOEs were often unable to obtain the credits and 
materials indicated in the plans. The rent-seeking activities also 
caused widespread public resentment and became a source of 
social instability. To guarantee the survival of the SOEs and to 
check social resentment, the government at.tempted to re-institute 
tight controls on the allocation mechanism in the austerity 
programs of 1986 and 1988. However, the controls were relaxed 
later to allow the growth of the non-state sectors. Except for the 
interest rate, administrative controls on the prices of most materials 
and comm~odities have been removed. 
37 The tot.31 credit of the State banks was 2.161.6 billion yuan (US$ 248.5 
billion at Lhe swap market exchange rate). The difference between the 
official interest rate and the market rate was about 10 percent. The rents 
from bank loans alone were as high as 216 billiorl yuan. 
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IV. Lessons from China's Transition 
Even we allow for to the possibility that, due to statistical 
problems, the growth rates in China could have been over reported 
and the economic collapses in EEFSU were over exaggerated, the 
contrast in the economic performances during their transition 
processes are still very dramatic. The successful experiences of 
China, to some extent also of Vietnam and Lao, up  to date have 
presented several challenges to the conventional wisdom about 
economic transition from a Soviet-type planning economy to a 
market economy. 
One of the earliest consensuses among economists advising 
EEFSU for their transition was the need for fast privatization. The 
arguments are a s  follows: Private ownership is the foundation for a 
well-function market system, real market competition requires a 
real private sector (Sachs and Lipton 19901, most problems 
encountering SOEs in a transitional economy can be ameliorated by 
rapid privatization (Sachs 1992). and privatization must take place 
before SOEs have been restructured (Blanchard et al. 1991).38 
Despite the ambiguity of property right arrangements of SOEs and 
TVEs, the productivity of SOEs in China improved significantly 
during the transition process and the TVEs in China became the 
most dynamic sector in the 1980s and early 1990s. The evidence 
suggests that the soft budget constraints and poor performance of 
SOEs in the Soviet-type economy is arising rather than from the 
paternalistic nature of the state ownership in a socialist economy, 
a s  argued by Kornai (1992) but from other factors.39 The 
38 Certainly there were some economists, arguing for an  evolutional, 
gradual approach to privatization. Komai (1990) is an example. He argues 
that private property rights cannot be made to work by fiat in the 
transitional economies where entire generations were made to forget the 
civic principles and values associated with private ownership and private 
rights and that a mere imitation of the most refined legal and business 
forms of the leading capitalist countries. However. Komai also believes that 
private ownership is the foundation for a well-functioning market system 
and privatization is the only way to eliminate the symptom of SOEs 
soft-budget constraints. 
39 SOEs poor performance and soft-budget constraints can bt: attributed to 
the policy burdens, including the viability issue arising from over-capital 
intensity in a capital-scarcity economy due to the governments CAS strategy 
and the burden of old-age pension and labor redundancy. Because of these 
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experience also suggests that pt:rformanct: of different busines .~ 
entities depends not on the formal ownership arrangement, as  the 
earlier privatization consensus believes, but on the incenthe 
structure and the degree of market competition.40 
Another early consensus for transition is the need for the 
complete big-bang price liberaliication. Arl influential paper by 
Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny (1!392) attributed the fall in outpl~t  
in Soviet. Union in 1990-1 to partial price liberalization. They argue 
thal. a dual-track pricing system woulcl encourage arbitrage, 
corruptiorl, rent seeking, and the diversion of scarce inputs frorn 
high-value to low-value use. Howt:ver. the dual-track price systern 
is one of the most significant features of China's approach to 
transition. While some of the problems, described by Murphy. 
Schleifer, and Vishny, have surfaced after the introductiori of the 
dual-track system in China, the majority of SOEs behaved in a way 
intended by the introduction of the: dual track system. That is, they 
were responsive to the market signals, enjoyed the rising payoff 
generated by the market opportunities, and they are evolving away 
from the planned track (Naughton 1995). The economy as  a whole 
and the state sector as  well continued to grow after t.he 
introduction of the dual-track system. I3y contrast, the economy 
collapsed and had a hyperinflation after I-enloving all price controls 
in EEFSU. McKinnon (1995) showed thal unless the SOEs had a 
hard budget constraint, a big bang price decontrol would cause the 
producer price level to increase indefinitely, both in absolute terms 
and relative to retail price, due to the SOE's unconstraint biddings 
for scarce resources. No meaningful equilibrium in producer prices 
would exist under such a condition. Therefore, as  long as  the 
budget co'nstraints of the SOEs remain soft, direct controls of price 
and resource allocation in this sector are desirable. On the one 
burdens, the government cannot require the SOEs to be accountable for 
their losses and need to subsidi:ce the SOEs when losses occur. 
Furthermol-e, because it is hard to distinguish between policy-induced losscs 
and operational losses, the SOEs can press the government to cover all its 
losses. Mor-a1 hazard becomes a serious problem in the SOEs (Lin, Cai. and 
Li. 1998. 2001: and Lin and Tan 1999). The performance of SOEs was thus 
poor. 
"he empirical evidence from EEFSU also shows that there exists n o  
ownership frontier, that is, efficient enterprises can be founded both in 
SOEs and private enterprises (Brada et al. 1994,  1997; Mencinger 1996: 
Pinto 1993: Frydman et al. 1996; Sereghyova 1993: and Jones 1997). 
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had, the controlled leg of the dual-rack system maintains the 
stability in the economy and allows the SOEs to operate 
continuously, and on the other hand, the liberalized leg of the dual 
track system provides the resources, incentives and signals to the 
non-state as  well as the SOEs to allocate resources to the dynamic 
areas of the economy. 
Similar to that in China, the countries in EEFSU were all 
over-industrialized with oversized SOEs; their service sectors and 
light industries were underdeveloped; and employees' incentives 
were low (Newbery 1993; Brada and King 1991; and Sachs and 
Woo 1994). Their economic problems - namely the structure imbal- 
ance and the low incentives-are also similar to those in the 
transitional economies in China because they all adopted a similar 
economic development strategy and because they all have a similar 
distorted price system, planned allocation mechanism, and puppet- 
like SOEs. From a theoretical point of view, the big bang approach 
attempt to remove all distortions so that the existing stock of 
resources can be utilized more efficiently. 
If the resources are highly mobile and can be moved freely from 
one sector to another sector, privatization can be accomplished in a 
stroke, and other market supporting institutions can be established 
over night, the big bang reform would be desirable. However, some 
fixed equipment in heavy industries cannot be used for production 
in light industries; for other equipments, modifications are required 
for new uses (Brada and King 1991). Workers in heavy industry 
also need retraining before they can be assigned to new jobs. 
Moreover, for many loss-making large SOEs, they cannot be 
privatized without restructuring first. Therefore, even Poland, the 
first country to implement the big-bang approach, the privatization 
proceeded only slowly. Moreover, if the SOEs were privatized 
without solving their viability issues, such as  in Russia, for fear of 
large unemployment, they could not be shut  down and the state 
would be obliged to continue all kinds of explicit or implicit 
subsidies.41 On one hand, the privatization would not be able to 
bring the hard budget constraints as  the program attempted 
4 1 In Russia, the explicit subsidies from fiscal appropriation reduced after 
the mass privatization but the implicit subsidies from soft bank loans, tax 
arrears, ad hoc tax exemptions, and so on continued. Even in Poland, tax 
arrears remained a problem (World Bank 1996, p. 45). 
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originally; on the other hand, many of the emerging private 
enterprises are turning to the state for all kinds of rents. 
Subsidies, tariff protection, legal monopolies, and re-distributional 
regulations still prevail even where direct state ownership has 
become r'are (Rrada 1996; Frydn- an et al. 1996: Lavigne 1995; 
Stark 1996; Sun 1997; and World Bank 2002). After th,: 
privatization, the former SOEs wt:re owned by a network of cross- 
ownership, involving banks, inve:jt.ment funds, other enterprises, 
state asset management agencies, and local governments. Thl- 
resulting ownership structure is far froni the clear, well-defined. 
private piroperty rights. In addjt-ion, the establishment of new 
market in.stitutions takes time and resources (Murrel anti Wang 
1993; and Lin 1989b). Therefore, even though the big bang 
approach is adopted, the market will not function as  desired in t i  
short period of time. During the initial stage of reforms, an 
increase i:n light industry and service sector would not be able to 
compensate for the decline in hemy industry. A decline in GDP i:; 
unavoidable. The experiences in EI3FSU show that the decline car) 
be Inore than 50 percent of CD:P and that it may take several 
years before a turning point is reached. Even for Poland, the besl 
case in the World Bank study, the decline in CDP was still very 
substantial. 19 percent in first two year, and the GDP did noL 
recover to the level of 1989 until 1995.42 Moreover, the stabilizatio~~ 
program did not work immediately as  in the case of Latin America. 
where most proponents of the big bang approach drew thei- 
experiences. High inflation or even hyperinflation continued foi- 
several years after the beginning of the stabilization program. Undeir 
such a dreadful situation, any government is certain to encounter a 
legitimacy crisis (Dewatripont and Roland 1992). The leadership 
may not be able to hold a consensus on t.he course of further 
reforms, and political instability is likely to follow. The quick shifts 
of government in the Eastern European countries after tht: 
42 I t  is noteworthy that when Poland engaged in the stabilization program. 
it had access to a full range of external support, made available by tht: 
IMF, the World Bank, and other international organizations (Jayawardena 
1990). Similar supports had been expected (Sachs 1991) but were noL 
available to other countries implementing a similar program later. hloreover. 
Poland is like the Quangdong provir~ce of China. Due to its geographic: 
proximity to Western Europe. Poland r.eceived a large inflow of foreign dirccl 
investment in the transitional process. 
364 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
beginning of transition proved this point. Instead of a "J-curve," as  
hoped by the advocators of big bang approach, the resulting 
pattern of GDP growth after implementing the big bang approach in 
EEFFSU has been a "L-curve,'' a sharp decline in GGP followed by 
a long period of stagnation before the coming of a sluggish 
recovery. 
If the transition can be big-banged, the issue of how to sequence 
reform was largely irrelevant. However, the experiences suggest that 
no matter what approach is adopted the actual transition from a 
Soviet-type economy to a market economy can only be a gradual 
process. Therefore, the micro first sequencing of transition in China 
should be viewed more positively. Before we draw any lessons, we 
needed to answer a number of often-raised questions about the 
applicability of China's experiences to the EEFSU. 
The first question is why the gradual reform adopted in Poland, 
Hungary, and former USSR before the adoption of big bang 
approach did not work. Those countries had also tried to reform 
their traditional system by allowing for SOEs more autonomy. 
However, their partial reform did not resulted in similar virtuous 
effects as  in China. A number of explanations are in order. 1) 
Unlike in China where the SOEs, after fulfilling their plan 
obligations, were allowed to sell their extra outputs a t  market 
prices, the enterprises in the EEFSU were not allowed to set their 
prices (Sachs 1993, p. 28). The price rigidity meant that excess 
demand and chronic shortage remained and the state producer 
would not have the incentives to allocate their products to more 
efficient users who would be able to pay higher prices for their 
products. 2) Entry by non-state enterprises was subject to severe 
restriction (Kornai 1986). Production remained monopolized and 
international trade remained centrally regulated (Sachs and Lipton 
1990). Therefore, unlike the SOEs in China after the transition, the 
existing SOEs in EEFSU never faced real competition pressure from 
domestic or international sources and lacked the incentives to 
improve productivity. 3) In the traditional Soviet-type system, to 
prevent the managerial discretion under the distorted macro-policy 
environment. SOEs were not allowed to set their workers' wage. In 
the Chinese case, after the micro-management reform, the wage 
was still controlled by the state. A worker's wage would increase 
only if the enterprise's profits exceeded the current level. However, 
in Poland. Hungary and the former USSR, their partial reform gave 
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the enterprises the autonomy to setting their own workers' wages. 
The weakening of the State control over wages gave the managers 
and workers an  opportunity to increase their incomes at  the 
expense of the State by absorbing whatever income flow a r d  
whatever assets they could obtain from SOEs. The State's revenutas 
were thus in great difficulty.43 4) The wage inflation caused the 
shortage to become even more acute. The government in Poland as  
well a s  in the former USSR tried to play a populist game, thvy 
increased the imports of consum1::r goods and made the countrirss 
fell into severe foreign indebtedness (Aslund 1991). Probably due 1.0 
the above differences, instead of bringing a continuous growth and 
gradual transition to a market economy as in China, the par t iJ  
reform led Poland and the former USSR to the brink of bankruptcy 
internally as  well as  externally and to the verge of hyperinflation. 
The second question is whether the people in the EEFSU wll  
respond lo the opportunity arising from the dual-track reform. In 
China, the engine of growth corries from the emerging non-state 
sectors, which derived their labor force in a large part from the 
unsubsidi~zed agricultural sector. ,Qricultural labor force in EEFSU 
was very small. In addition, it is argued that all workers, including 
agricultural workers on the state farms and the collective farms, 
received heavy subsidies from thl:. state. The argument then gors 
that only by ending the subsidization of the state sector was it 
possible 1.0 free labor from the state sector for the new non-stale 
sectors in the economy. Therefore the double-track gradual reform, 
which continues to give supports to the state sector, could not 
work in ithat context (Sachs and Woo 1994). However, even there 
are some opportunity costs for leaving the state sector, the 
incentives to leave the state sector also depends on the expected 
gain from working in the non-state sector. In China, the margin of 
free market prices to the planned prices is 20 to 40 percent in 
1980-91 (Gelb, Jefferson. and Singh 19931. 'I'he price margins could 
be 3 to 4 times or more in EEFSll (Aslund 1989).44 Therefore, even 
4?o some extent. China also encountered this problem. In spite of the 
increase in productivity, the profitability of the SOEs declined. As a result 
the governments fiscal revenues from the SOEs were reduced substantially 
(McKinnon 1995). 
14 One example is the exchange rate. In China the margin of market rate 
to the offii:ial exchange rate before the exchange rate unification in 1994 
was at most 50 percent throughout the whole transition per~od. In the 
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though the opportunity costs for a worker to shift to the non-state 
sector were higher in EEFSU than in China, the expected gains 
were also much larger. Kornai (1986) observes that in Hungary 
many of the people working in the private sector were in the 
highest income group. Aslund (1989, pp. 168-9) also cited many 
reports that in Russia some people working in the non-state sector 
producing simple products for the markets and became millionaires.45 
Therefore, a s  commented by Kornai (1990, p. 36). the relaxation of 
certain restrictions was enough to let private activity mushroom 
again. Turning a blind eye toward people who disregarded the letter 
of the law was sufficient for all those activities normally regarded 
a s  part of the second economy to catch on. People in the EEFSU 
before the transition were as responsive to profitable market 
opportunities a s  people in the transitional economy in China. 
The transition from a Soviet-type planning economy to a market 
economy has proved difficult for several reasons. These include a 
lack of seniceable institutional framework, the severe distortions in 
the price and production structures, and the relative dearth of 
historical precedents from which the transition economies could 
derive lessons. The big bang approach cannot deliver its promise of 
a jump to a market economy because the existing distorted 
institutions are endogenous to the non-viability issue of many 
enterprises in the priority sectors of CAD strategy adopted 
previously by the governments, and the stabilization cannot be 
achieved immediately by removing those institutional distortions 
without addressing the non-viability issue of the existing 
enterprises. As such, the crucial issue of the transition is to have a 
strategy of sequencing reforms that identifies the most pressing 
shortcomings and concentrates resources on the relaxation of 
binding constraints and that aspires to improve economic 
performance, leading to higher material welfare and better life 
chances (Rawski 1995). The IMF/World Bank's macro-first approach 
may be appropriate for the non-Soviet-type economy, where market 
institutions are more or less intake, the number of nonviable 
former Soviet Union, the official exchange rate was US$ 1.5 to one rouble 
in 1991. A tourist could easily get US$ 1 for 12 rouble on the street of 
Moscow. 
45~s lund  (1989, p. 169) cited one example. the average income per 
member was 12,500 rouble a month in a cooperative, which was 60 times 
of the average Soviet wage and 10 times of the top official salaries. 
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enterprises was limited and the si.ructure imbalance is less severe 
than the Soviet-type economy. 7'1-1 use the famous analogy in ,I 
somewhat different version, "When the chasm is narrow, its a 1  
right to jump over it." The stabilization program can achieve its 
goal immediately and the econoniy can soon operate in a normal 
market environment. However, in the Soviet-type economy, the 
chasm is too wide and too deep. A jump without careful 
preparation will definitely result in an  astonishing fall into ths: 
ditch. Under such a situation, it is desirable to fill and to narrolv 
the chasm first before making the jump. China's experiences 
suggest that it is possible to take advantages of the sever'? 
incentive suppression and serious structural imbalance in t h y  
Soviet-type economy to have a strategy of sequencing reforms that 
Improves incentives and reduces c-fistortic~ns in a gradual manner 
and obtains economic growth s~multaneously in the transitional 
process. From what we have obsr:mred, the useful lessons from thl? 
'micro h t "  approach to transition in China can be summarized a,; 
follows: 
First, the government can takr measures to improve the micro 
incentives by granting partial manageriill autonomy and profit- 
sharing to the micro units so as  to release the suppressed 
incentives and to allow the economy to  move closer to i t i  
production frontier. The governmen~t should t:ncourage the local ant1 
private initiatives in institutional ir~novations in this stage. 
Second, the government can ir~troduce a dual-track price anti 
allocation system allowing the resources to be allocated increasing1:y 
by the micro units to the previously suppressed, more productiv: 
sectors. j~hich are consistent uith the economys comparativ: 
advantages, while maintaining certain supports to the nonviable 
SOEs. 
Third, the government can liberalize the price when the 
commodity is largely allocated by the market track.46 
Fourth, the government graduallv introduces and strengthens th: 
necessary market institutions during the above process. 
Fifth, the government find ways to address the viability issue of 
the existing enterprises so as  to eliminate the root cause cf 
distortion:; in the Soviet-type planning economy and complete the 
4(> 13rlces here include foreign exchange rates, wages rates, interest rates. 
and the prlces of all products and serclces. 
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transition from the institutions of planning economy to those of a 
market economy.47 
V. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have analyzed the lessons of China's transition 
from a centrally planned socialist economy to a market economy 
from the viewpoint of institutional economics. Even though the 
reform in China was not guided by a well-defined blueprint, the 
transition has followed a path that can be explained by the theory 
of induced institutional innovation (Hayarni and Ruttan 1985; Lin 
1989; and North 1990). The traditional Soviet-type economic system 
was an internally consistent structure of institutional arrangements. 
consisting of the distorted price system, planned resource allocation 
mechanism, and puppet-like micro management units. The tradi- 
tional system made the mobilization of resources for building up  
the nonviable capital-intensive enterprises in the CAD strategy 
feasible in a capital-scarcity economy. However, its economic 
efficiency was low. The transition in China started with granting 
partial autonomy to micro units, which cracked the integrity of the 
traditional system. Once the institutional integrity of the traditional 
economic system was cracked, the institutional changes evolved in 
a way that was self-propelling toward the replacement of the 
traditional planning system with a more efficient market system. In 
the process, the efficiency of the SOEs was improved through 
greater autonomy and by meeting competition from the non-state 
sectors. However, the dynamism of the economy came mainly from 
47 In fact. China has not completed this step yet. The following reforms 
may be used to solve the issue. First, for those SOEs, if their products 
have large domestic markets, the government could allow them to list in the 
international equity markets or to form joint ventures with enterprises from 
developed countries. As long as  they can get access to foreign capital, their 
capital costs will be reduced and their viability issue will be eliminated. 
Second, for those SOEs their domestic markets are limited, the state should 
encourage them to shift their production to new market niches that are 
consistent with China's comparative advantage. The SOEs generally have the 
best-trained engineers and workers in China-they have a comparative 
advantage in human capital. If they are given the freedom to shift their 
production lines, they should be able to find a niche in the market where 
they are competitive (see Lin. Cai and Li (2001) for detailed discussions of 
SOE reform). 
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the swift entry of new, small. non-state enterprises. The old 
planned allocation mechanism and price distortions gradually 
became unsustainable and were discarded. During the reforln 
process, the State, the enterprises and the people have had 
sufficient time to make adjustmell1.s to the new market system. The 
reforrrls benefit the majority ol' people as  the economy has 
maintained strong growth through1:)ut the whole process. 
By contrast, the big bang approach adopted in EEFSU also 
attempts to replace the inefficient economic system with a more 
efficient market system. The privately owned small enterprises 
emerged immediately after the lifting of the ban on private 
enterprises, which became the driving force of economic growth in 
EEFSU (7Norld Bank 2002). However. the privatization of mediunl- 
and large-scale SOEs in most EEFSU countries, which did not 
implement the mass privatization, was prolonged and proceeded 
slowly. This resulting enterprise mix is in fact similar to what 
emerged in the transitional economy in China. However, China's 
approach did not disrupt the production in the state sector:i. 
Therefore. the gradual approach in China achieved the s a n e  
positive effects of the big bang approach but avoided the sudden 
collapse of economy. If transitional costs and the path-dependence 
of institutional changes are taken into account, China's gradual 
approach can be argued to be I:)oth theoretically and empirica1.y 
preferable to the "big bang" approach (Wei 1993). 
The adoption of an  approach l o  transition in a country reflected 
the socio-political condition in that country a t  the time of 
transition. When the transition began, the communist party in 
China was firm in control and its objective was to improve Ck~e 
system rather than to replace tl:~e system, while in EEFSU. tl-~e 
communi:st parties a s  well as socialist ideology had already 
collapse. However, the adoptions of a specific approach may also 
reflect cultural differences. For the transition from a wartirr~e 
economy after the World War 11, the Germany adopted a big bang 
approach and Japan adopted a gradual approach (Teranishi 1994) .  
In the 1950s, over 90 percent of manufacturing outputs in Taiwan 
were produced by the state sector. Instead of privatizing the SOE:i, 
Taiwan allowed the private enterprises to grow and to gradually 
become a dominant sector (Lau 1.993). The Asian culture stresses 
pragmatism, values measures that. will bring Pareto improvement in 
an incrernerital manner, and tends to turisl. the ideology to fit the 
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reality rather than the other way around.48 Western society seems 
to be more ideology oriented than the Asian society. Drawing on 
the history of the last three centuries of England and other 
Western economies, Schultz (1977) finds that the alteration and 
establishment of various distinct political-economic institutional 
arrangements in the Western society were induced or shaped up  by 
the dominant social thoughts in those times. In addition to the 
collapse of communist parties, the adoption of a big bang approach 
in EEFSU reflected the influence of prevailing "capitalist 
triumphalism" in the society (Wiles 1995). A dominant social 
thought may not be the "correct" one in the sense that the solution 
embodied in the thought will lead to a higher income growth rate 
and more desirable income distribution. Fundamentally, social 
thought is limited by the bounded rationality of the human mind. 
When the transition in the EEFSU started, Western policy advisers 
thought the process was a well-trodden path (Sachs 1993, p. 2) 
and it was possible to jump to a market economy. The experience 
in EEFSU now shows that, even though a big bang approach is 
adopted, the transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market economy will still be a slow, gradual process (World Bank 
1996. 2002; and Lavigne 1995. Chapter 10). Had the gradual 
nature of transition process had been known to the majority of 
people a t  the beginning of reform, the approach adopted in EEFSU 
might have been different. 
The lessons of China's transition, that were summarized in 
Section 111, may be useful for designing reform policies in other 
economies where the CAD strategy have been adopted under 
capital-scarce conditions.49 The lessons may also be useful for 
EEFSU, because their transition to a market economy is yet to be 
completed. However, it is important to recognize the differences in 
the stages of development, endowment structures, political systems. 
and cultural heritage in each country. To be effective, the actual 
reform measures should take the economy's initial conditions into 
48 For example, the Chinese government often labels any thing that works 
for China as  socialist. From this point of view, there is no confusion for a 
Chinese decision maker about what is a socialist market and what is the 
meaning of socialism with a Chinese character. 
4  he heavy industry-oriented development strategy in formal Soviet Union 
and China is a CAD strategy. The import-substitution strategy widely 
adopted in Latin America is another form of the CAD strategy. 
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consideration and exploit all favorable factors within and without 
the economy.50 Therefore, the specific design and sequence of 
reforms in a n  economy should be "induced" rather than "imposed." 
A simple transplantation of successful measures in an  economy ail1 
not guarantee its success in other economies. 
Even though the overall performance oi  China's approach to 
transition is very remarkable, the transition in China is not yet 
complete. Because the reform :in the distorted price systern. 
especially the reform in the interest rate policy, lags behind thc 
reforms in micro management ir1:ititution and resource allocatio~l 
mechanisr.n, institutional arrangements in the economic system 
become internally inconsistent. As a result of the institutional 
incompatibility, rent seeking, investment rush, and inflation arc; 
int.ernalized in the transition process. To mitigate these problems. 
the government often resorts to trii~ditional a.dministrative measure:; 
and causes the economy's dynamic grow* come to halt and the 
regression of institutions. From thc: above analysis one can see tha: 
it is imperative for China to complete the reform in price system so 
a s  to rernove the institutional incompatibility and so that thc: 
economy can set forth a susta.ined, smooth growth path. 111 
addition, as  the Chinese economy becomes a more matured market 
economy and more integrated with the world economy, it is 
essential for the continuous growth of the economy to establish a 
transparent legal system that protects property rights so as  to 
encourage innovations, technological changes. and domestic as  well 
as  foreign investments in these eco'nomies. 
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